Most Gazans Have Abandoned Hamas, and the Window for Disarmament Is Opening
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, a policy scholar born in Gaza, argues with four layers of opposition, two polls, and demographic data that most Gazans have long opposed Hamas and that Hamas may be forced to disarm in stages; but host Russ's pessimism reminds us that disarmament for Hamas is political suicide.
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The argument · timestamps estimated from transcript position
Gazans have responsibility too; occupation cannot be a shield
Alkhatib says he deliberately kept the book short and colloquial because there is already too much information about Gaza and no one reads long academic texts. The book is written for four audiences: pro-Israel communities, pro-Palestinian communities, Arab and Muslim Americans, and Palestinians themselves. The title is a judgment: Gazans are hostages of Hamas, despite radicalization and peripheral support for some of Hamas's past actions. He asks Palestinians to acknowledge their agency, responsibility, and accountability even under power asymmetry, rather than using "occupation" or "1948" as a shield. Russ responds that the book is only about 85 pages, yet he, who considers himself well-read on the subject, learned a lot.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibOn the day Hamas seized power, he was applying for asylum
Alkhatib was born in 1990, moved back and forth with his family in the late 1990s, permanently returned in 2000, and went to the US at 15 as an exchange student. He remembers the optimism at the end of the Oslo process: his family got their first landline and mobile phone, and he saw state institutions emerge in Gaza. Then came the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000, the Second Intifada, and Gaza turned to the other side. On June 14, 2007, the same day Hamas took over Gaza by force and drove out the Palestinian Authority, he happened to be interviewing for political asylum and became the first Gazan to receive asylum in the US because of Hamas's control of Gaza. He sees this date coincidence as a synchronization point between his personal fate and Gaza's fate.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibThe 2006 election was a gift from the US itself
Alkhatib obtained confidential discussion materials from a PLO official: before the 2006 election, the Palestinian Authority explicitly warned the Bush administration and Condoleezza Rice that Hamas would win, but the US still pushed for the election. Hamas leader Zahar allegedly later boasted that they deliberately had supporters underreport their support in Shikaki polls to prevent the US from canceling the election due to high poll numbers. Alkhatib says Shikaki's polls have long been manipulated, and a Hamas document found by the IDF in Gaza in August 2024 shows Hamas was correcting poll results, inflating error margins to 20% to 40% to exaggerate support. That election turned Hamas from a resistance movement into a regime ruling Gaza, and was the beginning of the path to October 7.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibSame people, two paths: Gaza builds rockets, West Bank builds a state
This is the framing section of the episode: Gaza and the West Bank became two contrasting experiments after Hamas took power. Hamas turned Gaza into an "armed resistance fortress," using aid and money from Qatar and Iran to build tunnels and rockets, while outsourcing civilian welfare to the UN and international NGOs; the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, under Salam Fayyad, built professional security forces and genuine state institutions. Alkhatib's criticism points at both sides: the cost of Hamas needs no elaboration, while Israeli PM Netanyahu's government, to maintain Palestinian division, allowed settlement expansion and weakened the PA's legitimacy, effectively prolonging Hamas's narrative. He cites the "South Korea vs North Korea" analogy: had the West Bank moderates been strongly supported, the trajectory would have been completely different.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibExternal funding is cut off; Hamas has only the path of disarmament
Alkhatib's optimism that Hamas will eventually partially disarm comes from hard constraints: Iran and Hezbollah are preoccupied, Qatar's LNG exports are frozen due to US-Iran conflict, so it can no longer fund Hamas; Hamas has lost most of its experienced fighters and nearly all senior political and military leaders, leaving only the option of accepting "phased disarmament." Russ's response is a clear point of disagreement: if the other side knows you want it to disappear, any concession is fake, because disarmament means the end of its control and lifeline. Alkhatib acknowledges there will be militias and tribal revenge, but he believes Gazan society has already distanced itself ideologically from Hamas, and the narrative shift will come earlier than the political shift.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibHamas is a lighter version of ISIS and the Taliban
Alkhatib divides Gazans' opposition to Hamas into four layers: the shallowest is "you destroyed Gaza, we pay for your suicidal nihilism"; the second is Hamas members enriching themselves during the war using aid and overseas fundraising, even bribing their way out of Gaza and then calling from abroad for continued resistance; the third is the overall twenty-year rule of Hamas, including suicide bombings and the destruction of the two-state solution; the fourth is the daily oppression by the Interior Ministry, from banning women from smoking hookah on the beach to Sinwar's 2020 attempt to legislate that women need male guardian approval to leave Gaza. His conclusion is direct: Hamas is "a lighter version of ISIS and the Taliban," only more concerned with public relations because PR keeps NGO and UN money flowing.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibPoll numbers in a police state are not worth trusting
Russ raises a methodological point: in a police state, poll numbers are meaningless because people dare not tell the truth, so he has always been deeply skeptical of Shikaki polls. Alkhatib offers alternative data: a poll by the Tony Blair Institute commissioned from Jim Zogby shows 93% of Gazans want Hamas to leave, and 86% hold Hamas equally responsible for Gaza's destruction. Demographics support his judgment: 70% of Gazans have never left Gaza, and nearly two-thirds are under 30, having only experienced Hamas rule and knowing the world through smartphones. He believes the largest group is not ideologically committed resisters but ordinary people driven by economic interests, who are the most reliable foundation for peace.
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibThe danger is not Gazans but the organization Hamas
Regarding the argument that "some October 7 attackers had worked in Israel and received medical treatment, yet betrayed those who treated them well," Alkhatib acknowledges that from a pre-war population of 2.3 million, they were a minority, but the problem is not individual cases but structure: as long as Hamas retains the capability to gather intelligence, recruit, and launch attacks, any interaction can be exploited under coercion. Once Gaza achieves disarmament and transitional governance, the risk will not go to zero but will drop exponentially to a manageable level. Russ cites the demilitarization of Japan and Germany after WWII as positive historical cases, but doubts whether the external management conditions can be met this time. The core disagreement shifts from "Can Gazans be trusted?" to "Will the organization Hamas completely disappear?"
— Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibIn their own words · checked verbatim
The narrative component of the conflict is, I would argue, even more significant than the politics and geopolitics, and I think that's about to change.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib36:48
Hamas is basically ISIS and Taliban light--a few degrees below.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib44:32
We are lovers of life. We're not martyrdom projects. We don't love death more than your love for life and this cultism.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib1:04:28
One of my goals is: I think it is beyond necessary at this point to essentially reinvent Palestinian identity.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib1:04:28
I'm lonely, but I am far, far from being alone.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib1:11:41
I'm ashamed that my once-beautiful Gaza is connected to the single worst day attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib1:11:41
If you will it, it's not a dream; and, if we stop the violence, the future will begin.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib1:21:34
Figures
| Book page count | about 85 pages | 8:03 |
| Alkhatib's birth year | 1990 | 18:09 |
| Age when leaving Gaza | 15 | 18:09 |
| Asylum interview same day as Hamas takeover | June 14, 2007 | 18:09 |
| Zogby/Tony Blair Institute poll: Gazans wanting Hamas to leave | 93% | 44:32 |
| Zogby/Tony Blair Institute poll: Gazans holding Hamas equally responsible for Gaza's destruction | 86% | 44:32 |
| Gazans who have never left Gaza | 70% | 44:32 |
| Population under 30 | nearly two-thirds | 44:32 |
| Pre-war Gaza population | 2.3 million | 54:18 |
Glossary
- Shikaki polls
- Polls by Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki, alleged to have been long manipulated by Hamas to inflate support.
- NCAG
- National Coalition for Administrative Governance in Gaza, a non-partisan technocratic body proposed as a future alternative to Hamas.
- Great Reset
- Alkhatib's proposed 100-day zero-violence window to push for direct negotiations, unrelated to Davos.
- UNRWA
- The main UN agency providing education and health to Palestinian refugees in Gaza; Alkhatib's father worked there.
- DSA
- Democratic Socialists of America, a US left-wing organization criticized by Alkhatib for supporting Hamas.
How to listen
Investors focused on Middle East geopolitics and post-war reconstruction, policy analysts studying polling and propaganda mechanisms, and insiders who want a real internal perspective rather than slogans.
Around 25:24, Russ's monologue about the Israeli left's dilemma is not central to the core argument and can be skipped.