The First Public Atheist Was a Country Priest Who Didn't Dare Publish
Meslier wrote the Testament denying God's existence but dared only to copy three manuscripts for posterity; Bayle used skepticism to show that religious questions exceed reason, and therefore no one has the right to persecute others in the name of faith.
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Five hundred episodes without a single public atheist
The show has reached nearly five hundred episodes without ever featuring a thinker who publicly declared himself an atheist. The ancients who were occasionally accused of atheism, on closer inspection, mostly held unorthodox views of the divine, like the Epicureans. The only ancient case that really stands up is the sophist Diagoras, but his writings are lost. The author therefore proposes: if there really is a clear history of atheist philosophy, its European starting point is probably around the turn of the eighteenth century.
— Peter AdamsonA priest writes a manuscript denying God
Meslier (Jean Meslier) was an obscure country priest of blameless life, yet he left behind a Testament that fiercely attacked Christianity and denied God's existence. He said he had accepted holy orders only to please his parents, and had always loathed performing those idolatrous and superstitious masses. He dismantled the faith from several angles: there is no reason to prefer Christianity to other religions; Christians are required to believe absurd doctrines that other religions lack, such as the Eucharist; the quarrels and violence among Christians themselves show precisely the danger of blind faith; the Old Testament endorses animal sacrifice and absurdly claims that God chose the Jews.
— Peter AdamsonThe problem of evil is his main weapon against God
Meslier was a rationalist, claiming his arguments relied only on the "light of natural reason," and that this light led him to the conclusion that God does not exist at all. His chief argument is the problem of evil: he says ironically that Christians call God a father, yet this father abandons his children to every kind of suffering and evil. He has nothing but contempt for arguments for God's existence, especially against Fénelon: if perfect things need a creator, then doesn't this perfect creator also need a creator, leading to an infinite regress; since the physical universe plainly exists, why not stop there instead of positing an invisible cause?
— Peter AdamsonHe didn't dare publish in his lifetime, only made three copies
Why has no one heard of this man, why wasn't he arrested or even executed? Two questions, one answer: Meslier was bold and fearless, but not bold enough to publish these heretical thoughts while alive. In his later years he copied three manuscripts of the Testament for posterity, claiming he did not care about posthumous fame, and ended by writing that he was "almost nothing, and would soon be nothing." He did want to be read; the text often calls on readers to abandon superstition and to resist tyranny closely bound up with religion. He believed the idea of God was originally invented by rulers to oppress others more effectively.
— Peter AdamsonReligion and politics prop each other up, and he also advocated communism
Meslier wrote that religion supports political rule, however vicious it may be; political rule in turn supports religion, however false it may be. He went further and advocated communism, envisioning a society with all property held in common, modeled on Plato's Republic. Thus the charges against him would include not only blasphemy and heresy but sedition. A few years after his death, copies began to circulate secretly; Voltaire published excerpts in 1761, but avoided the most seditious parts. This cautious and incomplete reception meant Meslier failed to spark the political and conscientious revolution he wanted.
— Peter AdamsonHis arguments were not new to contemporary readers
The author suspects Meslier's arguments would only shock readers, not shake their faith. For such anti-religious arguments had long been considered, if only to be refuted. What is special about the Testament is the emotional intensity and its political agenda; but as for arguments about religion and God, it is a bit like a scholastic treatise that keeps only the hypothetical objections and deletes the responses. The theologians Meslier despised, at least in their own view, would have had little difficulty meeting his challenge.
— Peter AdamsonAnother anonymous atheist work, nine hundred pages
A few decades before Meslier, the Theophrastus Redivivus, written in 1659, also circulated only in a few manuscripts and was not published until the early 1980s. Its title page lists Diagoras, the Epicureans, Sextus Empiricus, and also Protagoras—who said he could not know whether the gods exist, which strictly speaking is agnosticism rather than atheism. Strangely, the theists Plato and Aristotle are also listed on the title page; the book explains that they too were really atheists, merely veiling their true beliefs under a dogmatic mask. This anonymous author was clearly a firm atheist as well, opposing faith to natural reason and saying that in a fair debate the theologian, using only purely rational premises acceptable to philosophers, would have no chance.
— Peter AdamsonA pious frame around nine hundred pages of atheism
Unlike Meslier, this author placed his lengthy atheistic discussion within a pious frame: brief statements at the beginning and end say these arguments are only so that learned theologians can refute them. But this looks like mere lip service, since these few pages of religious piety are sandwiched between about nine hundred pages of atheistic argument. Since both Meslier and the Theophrastus Redivivus were little known at the time, the title of the first known atheist in early modern Europe probably goes to Matthias Knutzen, who in 1674 distributed anti-religious pamphlets in Germany, even handing them out in churches and at the University of Jena.
— Peter AdamsonBayle: the non-public atheist had greater influence
Knutzen thus earned an entry in Bayle's dictionary. Bayle did not publicly endorse Knutzen, but noted that alongside his atheistic views Knutzen affirmed solid ethical principles, showing that unbelief does not necessarily lead to immorality. As for Bayle's own position on religious belief or unbelief, it is far more obscure than that of the public atheists, but partly for that very reason it spread and influenced far more widely. As a result, Bayle's importance in the history of atheism is at least as great as that of Meslier, Knutzen, and the authors of those anonymous irreverent works, even though Bayle himself, doubts notwithstanding, very likely remained a Christian believer.
— Peter AdamsonA society made up entirely of atheists
In the earlier Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Comet of 1681, Bayle criticized the reaction to the comet's appearance the previous year, which many took as some kind of omen. Bayle said this superstition was worse than atheism. He went on to observe that a society made up entirely of atheists would probably be no less harmonious or moral than a religious society. He explained that pity, temperance, kindly inclinations, and so on do not come from knowing there is a God, but from a certain temperament, plus education, self-interest, desire for praise, an instinct of reason, or similar motives—motives that atheists have just as much as anyone else.
— Peter AdamsonAtheists can do good just as Christians can
Bayle's line of thought here resembles that of Catholic moralists like La Rochefoucauld, but he drew a conclusion they apparently did not notice: since people often do good from considerations like reputation rather than religious belief, atheists should be able to do good just as religious people do. Bayle may not have been as cynical as the French moralists; he mentions an instinct of reason, not just self-interest; elsewhere in the Comet he seems to accept that unbelievers may also perform genuinely altruistic acts. But in the first clarification of the dictionary, Bayle retreats to a more La Rochefoucauld-like position, saying that when ancient pagans and atheists did good, they were not truly virtuous, but merely acted well out of self-love.
— Peter AdamsonExecuted criminals always seem to have been believers
In the clarification Bayle says quietly that in his dictionary he has always tried when possible to mention the wicked deeds of atheists, but that the historical evidence for such deeds is scarce—of course, mainly because there were so few atheists to discuss. But he adds provocatively that criminals executed for heinous crimes always seem to have been believers. From Bayle's other works it is clear that for him moral conscience springs from reason, not faith: the principles of good conduct are universal and need not be based on a grasp of God. Just as atheists have no trouble doing mathematical proofs, they can also do what is right.
— Peter AdamsonArguing for religious toleration from a Bible verse
Like Meslier, Bayle was angry about violence among Christians, but instead of using it directly to reject religion, he argued passionately for the value of religious toleration. Central here is his philosophical commentary on a biblical phrase: Jesus says people should be compelled to enter the door, lest they be shut out. Augustine and others interpreted this to mean the church may use coercion to force people to join and take part in the true religion. Bayle opposed this, pointing out, as Meslier did, the diversity of religions: all believers think their own religion is true, and they can all equally think they have reason to impose their faith on others—a recipe for disaster, exactly the kind Europe was then suffering. Bayle's own brother died in prison under religious persecution, so this was no theoretical matter for him.
— Peter AdamsonIf Calvinism happened to be right, could it persecute?
There is an obvious objection to Bayle: suppose Calvinist Protestants happened to be right, and not only Christianity is true but Calvinism is also the correct interpretation of Christian doctrine. Then Calvinists would have reason to persecute others, hoping to win them back to the truth, since those others' salvation hangs by a thread, and leaving them in error and sin would even be unforgivable negligence. Bayle's answer relies on his concept of moral conscience: everyone at all times has an unconditional obligation to do what he believes morally right. He borrows a Montaigne-style example: you see a little girl about to fall into a well, and conscience tells you to rush over and push her away, even at the cost of slightly injuring her. It turns out it was not a well but a paddling pool decorated to look like one, and the child is perfectly safe; but because you did not know, your obligation to push the child away is equally real.
— Peter AdamsonOnly invincible ignorance excuses
Bayle argues on this basis: if it is right to persecute others for the true religion, then anyone who believes his religion is true is obliged to persecute others for it, whether or not that religion is actually true. This is absurd, because it means Catholics and Protestants persecuting each other are both fulfilling an obligation and acting rightly, and so are Muslims persecuting Christians. One might respond: we do have an obligation to follow the judgment of conscience, but when the judgment is clearly mistaken, it is less credible that the obligation still holds. Back to the paddling pool: if I inferred it was a well merely because there was a bucket beside it, ignoring that it was bright pink plastic and had an inflatable giraffe floating in it, then it was my fault for jumping to conclusions, and my supposed obligation is weakened by my carelessness in forming the belief. In scholastic terms, one is excused for error only under "invincible ignorance"; and in religious matters ignorance is not unavoidable—we can find the right answer, and we are obliged to look for it.
— Peter AdamsonBayle's skepticism: reason cannot adjudicate religion
It is here that Bayle's skeptical method becomes crucial. His dictionary returns again and again to the difficulty of determining truth in religious matters. A typical example is his treatment of the problem of evil raised by Meslier. Bayle discusses it in several parts of the dictionary, including the entry on Manichaeism and one of the closing clarifications. He boldly suggests that the Manichaeans had compelling reasons to reject belief in a single all-good God and instead posit a second supernatural power, a "counter-god" responsible for evil. Bayle says one can give what he calls an a priori argument for monotheism, that purely rational considerations point to a single God; but the a posteriori evidence of suffering in the world strongly supports the Manichaean view.
— Peter AdamsonReason has no standing in the religious domain
Bayle seems to think this is in effect an argumentative stalemate, which reason cannot resolve. If we still accept monotheism, it must be out of faith in revelation. As he says in the clarification, it is impossible to resolve the difficulties raised by philosophers, so a debate using only the light of nature will always end badly for the theologian, who will be forced to retreat and take shelter under the protection of supernatural light. This example shows that for Bayle religious matters lie beyond natural reason, and reason has no standing at all in this domain. Then of course we cannot be obliged to discover the truth: in religious matters we grope in the dark, so this ignorance, even if not invincible, is at least excusable.
— Peter AdamsonWhat about the conscientious persecutor?
This helps Bayle solve another problem often thought to arise from his toleration theory: if someone's conscience tells him he ought to persecute, does Bayle's theory not imply he is fulfilling an obligation? Bayle notices this "conscientious persecutor" problem and tries to escape it. He says that although it sounds contradictory, there are cases where we are indeed obliged to do wrong: it is wrong to knock over a child playing quietly by the paddling pool, but if the pool looks like a well, I am still obliged to do so; likewise a judge who condemns an innocent man does wrong, but if the evidence seems clearly to point to his guilt, he is still obliged to condemn. The conscientious persecutor seems to be in this situation, obliged to oppress others, while oppression is evil.
— Peter AdamsonThe evil of persecution is obvious
This may be enough for Bayle, because it shows the persecutor really is doing wrong. He would be in a dilemma: to persecute is a sin, and to go against conscience and persecute is also a sin. But the key point is that Bayle can say that, unlike the mysteries of religion, the evil of persecution is obvious. He has just given a very straightforward argument for why persecution inevitably leads to unjustified mutual violence. So anyone who has reflected, especially anyone who has read Bayle, ought to abandon the judgment of conscience that tells them to oppress others, and if they do not, they are to blame.
— Peter AdamsonIn their own words · checked verbatim
I am hardly more than nothing, and soon I will be nothing.
Peter Adamson5:17
Religion methle writes supports the political government as malicious as it may be and in turn the political government supports religion as vain and false as it may be.
Peter Adamson6:18
the inclination to pity, to sobriety, to good-natured conduct and so forth does not stem from the fact that one knows there to be a god, but from a certain disposition of the temperament, fortified by education, by personal interest, by the desire to be praised, by the instinct of reason, or by similar motives that are met with in an atheist, as well as in other men.
Peter Adamson11:21
criminals put to death for heinous crimes do somehow always seem to be believers in God.
Peter Adamson13:22
it is impossible to solve the difficulties raised by philosophers and consequently a dispute in which only the natural light will be employed will always end to the disadvantage of the theologians and they will find themselves forced to give ground and take refuge under the protection of the supernatural light.
Peter Adamson19:25
unlike the mysteries of religion, the evil of persecution really is obvious.
Peter Adamson21:27
Figures
| Year Voltaire published excerpts of Meslier's Testament | 1761 | 6:18 |
| When the Theophrastus Redivivus was written and published | written in 1659, published in the early 1980s | 8:19 |
| Length of the atheistic argument in the Theophrastus Redivivus | about 900 pages | 9:19 |
| Year Knutzen distributed anti-religious pamphlets | 1674 | 9:19 |
| Year Bayle's Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Comet was published | 1681 | 10:21 |
Glossary
- invincible ignorance
- A scholastic term: an erring person is excused only if he has done everything possible and still cannot avoid the error.
- Manichaeism
- A dualist religion holding that two supernatural powers, good and evil, are opposed.
- Theophrastus Redivivus
- An anonymous atheistic work of 1659, written under the name of Aristotle's pupil, published only in the 1980s.
How to listen
Listeners interested in early modern atheism and the history of religious toleration, especially those who want to understand how Bayle used skepticism to defend toleration.
The opening chat about the show's 500-episode milestone and future plans can be skipped.