Okinawa's Turn Is Not a Pro-China Loss, It's Young Voters Settling for Material Gains
In the Okinawa gubernatorial election, the side opposing the US military base lost after nearly twenty years in power. This is not a left-right shift, nor a change in attitude toward China: after decades of protest with the base not moving an inch, young voters have given up and want economic benefits first.
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The approval rating holds steady because the Diet is out of session
The Diet session ended, and there was no political agenda all summer, so there was no occasion for the Prime Minister to lose points — in the show's words, "say less, err less." Takaichi is now governing entirely on X: no press conferences, no facing the media, just posting those very long tweets. So the approval rating holding steady is neither new policy earning points nor the crisis being over. The real test is in September: the Diet reconvenes, plus a dense diplomatic season from September to the end of the year — in the show's words, entering a troubled autumn.
Okinawa's turn is not a left-right contest
Denny Tamaki's third term came to an abrupt end, and his opponent was a pure newcomer born in 1972, with no memory of the US occupation. Exit polls showed that among the issues voters cared most about, "economic revitalization" was 49.5%, and "base issues" only 20.9%; the vote was 420,000 to 270,000. This is not Okinawa becoming conservative, but exhaustion after decades of protest with the base not moving an inch: after nearly twenty years in power, voters felt "enough, let's try something different," and wanted immediate economic benefits. As soon as the newcomer won, the central government's Okinawa promotion budget immediately jumped by 300 billion yen and was announced publicly; Japanese Communist Party leader Tomoko Tamura cried over this, saying it amounted to indirect vote-buying. Taiwanese media writing it as a "pro-China loss" is pushing an agenda.
The US Treasury Secretary has become Japan's overlord
Bessent has already directly spoken to the market, demanding the yen stop falling. The show says he "basically can already become the MacArthur of Japan's economic circles" — an overlord directly giving instructions. Why would a US Treasury Secretary fixate on the yen? Because a weak yen drags down US Treasuries, and the US runs entirely on issuing debt, with debt already exceeding 40 trillion dollars; unsellable Treasuries are the most fatal problem. He first wrote down on paper how much it would cost to intervene in the exchange rate, was photographed by the media as a hint, found it couldn't hold for even a week, and then switched to explicit statements, saying he is the market maker and has 6 billion dollars in hand. The Bank of Japan subsequently signaled it would not rule out consecutive rate hikes.
No political party dares oppose tax cuts
Takaichi's weak spot is fiscal and exchange rate policy. She is the heir to the Abe line, and the narrative that "a certain degree of inflation is acceptable, a weak yen benefits exports" has been digested by the Japanese public for many years; but even the mind that guided Abe in creating the three arrows is now saying that Japan has entered an inflationary channel and can no longer pursue active fiscal policy. The trouble is that tax cuts are highly politically correct in Japanese politics; all parties are shouting for them, and if you don't follow along, you get no votes. The only party that raised an objection is too insignificant. Shigeru Ishiba, Taro Kono, and Megumi Kobuchi have all publicly opposed it, and Kobuchi even resigned as chairman of the Policy Research Council over it. Moreover, the tax cut plan itself has been made complicated; people in the restaurant business complain they're being toyed with: buy this and get a cut, buy that and don't, with the story changing every time.
Only the LDP can defeat the LDP
Takaichi is currently stable because her public support is high, and party members who want to challenge her don't dare declare too early. The more fundamental problem in Japanese politics is that the opposition parties are ineffective: the Democratic Party got a chance in 2009 but did so poorly that the public was scared off, and for the next decade-plus they didn't dare give the opposition any more chances, voting LDP all along. So no matter how the opposition forces split and merge, they can't shake the structure; the show believes there will be no earth-shattering change within Japan. The real variable is inside the LDP: Takaichi has public opinion but no faction base of her own, so she must rely on the Aso faction, and the two have a love-hate relationship where they need each other but also guard against each other.
The cabinet reshuffle changes neither the soup nor the medicine
The observation point is whether the Secretary-General is replaced, because that is an indicator of the Takaichi-Aso relationship. The result was that all key positions stayed put and the Secretary-General remained. In July and August there were rumors that Aso was dissatisfied with Takaichi and had a secret three-hour meeting with Toshimitsu Motegi, briefly making people think they were about to fall out; in the end, no personnel changes, which can only be interpreted as Takaichi continuing to compromise with Aso — "the attempted rebellion didn't succeed." The logic is simple: policies like active fiscal policy and whether to raise rates can't be pushed forward without Aso faction support, and Aso, who comes from the finance ministry, has many handles on her. Another observation point is whether Koichi Hagiuda returns to a key post — that would mean the black-money party ticket issue is already behind him.
The most promising non-mainstream figure is Yoshimasa Hayashi
In the last leadership election, Yoshimasa Hayashi came third; Shinjiro Koizumi threw in with Takaichi and entered the cabinet as Defense Minister, while Hayashi himself took the Internal Affairs and Communications Minister post. He is seen as capable of challenging Takaichi: he follows the LDP's traditional dovish line, completely different from Takaichi, and can also rally the anti-Takaichi party base. But to challenge the incumbent president, staying in the cabinet is actually more controlled, and there's no time to travel the regions, which is exactly his weakness — he originally belonged to the Kishida faction, so he doesn't lack parliamentary votes, but lacks local name recognition and trust. Makiko Tanaka's assessment of him: long in the House of Councillors, not aggressive or ruthless enough in politics, hasn't dirtied his hands and feet, more like a staffer than a daimyo. So whether he accepts the next cabinet post is itself Takaichi testing him.
As long as Takaichi is in office, nothing will change
From mid-to-late August, Japanese lawmakers visited China one after another, and many Japanese media interpreted this as a softening of China's attitude. The leading lawmaker clarified upon return: he proposed the idea in February this year, China agreed in May, and the trip happened in August — it was not a Chinese invitation. The International Liaison Department's response was direct — as long as Japan's attitude does not change, there will be no change at the government level. And Takaichi cannot retract her remarks or apologize, so as long as she is in office, there can be no essential change. The show goes further: even if someone else takes over, if they continue with ambiguous statements, it won't be recognized either. The show cites Shigeru Ishiba's view that Japan originally had room for ambiguous statements, but it was Japan itself that spoke definitively and backed itself into a corner.
In their own words · checked verbatim
And now he's completely governing via X. He just doesn't respond — no press conferences, no facing the media, just posting on X every day, those very long tweets.
而且他现在完全X治国了 对他就他就不回应 就是不开记者发布会 对 也不面对媒体 就天天发X发那个非常长的那种推文
He said, can this kind of politics be allowed? It's like you're indirectly buying votes.
他说 这样的政治 都是可以被允许的吗 就等于你现在 变相买票
He can basically already become the MacArthur of Japan's financial circles, of Japan's economic circles. Yeah, basically directly giving instructions — an overlord.
基本上已经可以成为 日本财经界 日本经济界的麦克阿瑟了 对 基本上就直接下指导期了 太上皇了
Because now the US runs entirely on issuing debt — already 40 trillion, already 40 trillion dollars. That's already broken through the mark.
因为现在美国是完全要靠 发债来运行的 已经40万亿 已经40万亿美元了 这已经突破大关了
Tax cuts are now a highly politically correct thing in Japanese politics. All parties are saying they want tax cuts. If you don't follow along, you get no votes.
减税现在在日本政坛 是一个高度政治正确的事 所有的党都在说要减税 你不跟进的话 你就没有票
The Japanese public was scared off by that wave in 2009. They don't dare give the opposition any chance, and just keep voting LDP.
日本老百姓从09年那一波就吓怕了 就不敢给在野党任何机会 就一直投自民党
As long as Takaichi Sanae is still in office, change is impossible. Everyone should stop fantasizing about this.
就只要高尸早苗还在台上 不可能改变了 大家不要幻想了这个事情
Figures
| Okinawa gubernatorial election vote count | 420,000 votes vs 270,000 votes | 12:10 |
| Okinawa exit poll: most important issues | Economic revitalization 49.5%, base issues 20.9% | 12:10 |
| US national debt | 40 trillion dollars | 21:14 |
| Bessent's claimed available funds for exchange rate intervention | 6 billion dollars | 22:15 |
| Food consumption tax cut plan | Cut to 1%, for two years | 26:15 |
| Timeline of Japanese lawmakers' visit to China | Proposed in February, China agreed in May, trip in August | 1:06:36 |
Glossary
- Middle Power
- A country whose power lies between that of a great power and a small state; the show says Japanese conservatives refuse to accept this positioning.
- Japan's back
- The Takaichi administration's external slogan; the show jokes that this path of return is more likely to be getting lost.
- Chudo
- A political party formed by the merger of Komeito and the Constitutional Democratic Party for elections, which announced its dissolution after a crushing defeat in a snap election.
How to listen
Investors and people doing business with Japan who care about Japanese politics, the yen exchange rate, and the direction of China-Japan relations; anyone who wants to understand how Japanese conservative politics operates.
The segment after 34:30 about the dissolution of Chudo is closest to a news roundup and can be fast-forwarded.