Germany's CDU Falls Out of a State Parliament: The Era of the Centre Is Over
The CDU won less than 5% in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, shut out of a state parliament for the first time since the Federal Republic was founded. Merz has lost his authority, and the populist far left and far right hold overwhelming majorities among voters under 35.
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The argument · timestamps estimated from transcript position
The CDU is shut out of a state parliament for the first time
In the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state election, the CDU won less than 5% of the vote and therefore holds no seats in the state parliament — the first time this has happened in the history of the Federal Republic. In the same election the AfD took about 38% of the vote, once again becoming the state's largest party. The author calls this the "final nail in the coffin" for Merz: he may hang on as chancellor for a few more weeks or months, but his authority is gone, his capacity to shape the country utterly exhausted — in political language, "a dead man walking."
The CDU's decline came later than the SPD's but is just as fatal
The CDU is the most important party in postwar German history, governing the Federal Republic for 53 of the past 77 years, and from Adenauer to Kohl to Merkel it left its mark on every aspect of the country. The author notes that in the early 2000s everyone was talking about "the crisis of social democracy," as the SPD fell from over 40% support to record lows; in hindsight, the fate of the centre-left big party was only a leading indicator of a broader crisis of the entire political centre, and the CDU then walked the same road. The era of what Germans call the Volksparteien — catch-all parties able to mobilise most of the vote — is effectively over.
Populists are not a fringe phenomenon but the most important political force
The author says this is the most-asked question of the past decade: "Will the populist wave last, or is it about to peak?" In the summer of 2016, when Trump became the Republican nominee and Britain voted for Brexit, the answer seemed obvious to him; now the answer is undeniable — the populists are here to stay. What looked abnormal a few years ago has, whether you like it or not, become the mainstream. Populist politicians now hold power in the United States, India, Turkey and much of the democratic world, and have a very high probability of taking office in France and Brazil in the coming months. Even where they remain in opposition, they are already strong enough to destroy any sense of business as usual.
The rise of one extremist party is feeding another
In the Berlin state election, Die Linke took 26% of the vote and emerged the big winner. The party descends from the SED, which ruled East Germany with an iron fist, and after reunification initially appealed mainly to older voters nostalgic for the security of the communist system; in recent years it has remade itself in the image of the global illiberal left, which the author considers roughly comparable to Zack Polanski's Greens in Britain or the more extreme parts of the DSA in the United States. During the campaign, some of its supporters were filmed chanting "Yalla, Yalla Intifada!"; on election night, the head of a notorious crime family visited the party's election party and cheerfully told the media he felt an affinity with it. The party's leader will very likely now become the next mayor of Berlin, which would be the first time an heir to the SED has taken power in the capital.
Voters under 35 have swung to the two extremes
Another notable feature of the two elections is the age distribution. The SPD and CDU, which once dominated Germany's political landscape, draw most of their support from pensioners. Among voters under 35, Die Linke and the AfD hold unassailable majorities in both Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. From this the author concludes that the coming years will bring an even larger tilt toward the extremes. This also explains why the collapse of the centre is not a one-off election accident: the structure of the electorate itself is pushing the scales toward the two ends.
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern's left coalition is just an election accident
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, because a batch of other parties all failed to clear the 5% threshold for entering parliament, a broad left coalition just barely won enough votes to govern. But the author stresses that this is an election accident unlikely to repeat — a few thousand votes either way and the state would be completely ungovernable. The point matters: when centrist parties fall below the threshold, they don't just lose their own seats, they push the governability of the whole state to the edge of a cliff.
Don't surrender, and don't deny the problem is real
The author explicitly rejects two responses. The first is to urge the centre to surrender: if the political centre can't hold, moderates might as well defect to the extremists on "their own side." He thinks this is wrong — neither Die Linke nor the AfD can solve the real problems Germany faces, and despite their enormous differences they have conspicuous similarities, from their ambiguity toward Moscow to their persistent inability to purge antisemites from their own ranks. The second is to keep denying reality: for a decade the centre has attributed the extremists' success to foreign interference, social media algorithms, some candidate's tactical blunder, or the stupidity, sexism or racism of voters. The author says these ways of blinding yourself to the facts in front of you may be comforting, but they are just as dangerous.
In their own words · checked verbatim
For Merz, this is the last nail in the coffin: He may cling to office for another few weeks or months. But his authority is now gone, his ability to shape the country totally depleted. In political terms, he is a dead man walking.
But the era in which catch-all parties like the Christian Democrats could shape the political landscape is rapidly coming to an end. The void they are leaving behind is quickly filling with extremists of every stripe—not just in Germany, but all around the democratic world.
Now, it has grown undeniable: The populists are here to stay. What seemed abnormal a few years ago has—like it or hate it—become mainstream. Populists are no longer a fringe phenomenon; they are the most important force in today’s politics.
In retrospect, it is clear that the fate of the major center-left parties was but a leading indicator for a much broader crisis of the political center: in time, the Christian Democrats duly followed suit.
Among voters below 35, The Left and the AfD held an unassailable majority in both Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. This suggests that an even greater lurch to the extremes is likely in the offing over the course of the coming years.
Those of us who seek to preserve the values of a free society must stick to our principles. But we must also recognize that there are real reasons why millions upon millions of our compatriots are losing faith in the ability of existing parties and institutions to get to grips with genuine problems.
Figures
| AfD vote share in the Saxony-Anhalt state election | 44% | 0:00 |
| AfD vote share in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state election | about 38% | 0:00 |
| CDU vote share in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern | less than 5% | 0:00 |
| Years the CDU has governed the Federal Republic | 53 of 77 years | 0:00 |
| Die Linke vote share in the Berlin state election | 26% | 0:00 |
| Vote threshold for entering a state parliament | 5% | 0:00 |
Glossary
- Volksparteien
- Large mainstream catch-all parties able to mobilise most of the vote and span all social classes.
- AfD
- Germany's far-right party, whose support has risen rapidly in recent years.
- Die Linke
- Germany's left-wing party, descended from East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED).
- SED
- The communist party that ruled East Germany with an iron fist, and Die Linke's predecessor.
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Investors and policy researchers watching the direction of European politics, German political dynamics and the long-term populist trend, especially those who need to assess European political risk.
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