Asia completed TPP without America returning or China taking over
The US extends its China security competition across all Asia policy; China has learned US-style economic coercion; the result is regional fragmentation rather than bipolarity.
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Asia completed TPP without America returning or China taking over
Obama defended TPP saying ‘we don't write the rules, China will’. After Trump withdrew, the other 11 members completed the deal—neither America returned nor China joined. This shows how regional order actually works: not through binary US-China competition, but through first movers—countries like Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei that liberalize first and set the template for others to join.
— Evan FeigenbaumUS and China are the same: both strategic narcissists fixated on each other
US and China have almost nothing in common—different political systems, economic models, strategic logic—yet share one striking quality: both treat nearly all regional affairs as expressions of their mutual competition. Evan calls this ‘strategic narcissism’. He acknowledges this contradicts the Chinese position on Belt and Road as win-win cooperation, but judges that China is learning American behavior. The two countries' patterns are converging.
— Evan FeigenbaumAmerica's focus on China security has absorbed its entire Asia strategy
The US securitizes China policy: nearly all economic flows—goods, capital, people, technology, data—now pass through a national-security filter. Simultaneously, it China-izes Asia policy: China becomes the sole reference point for almost every regional decision. The result: the entire Asia policy itself becomes securitized. Regional countries have begun asking what else America actually offers.
— Evan FeigenbaumUS-Korea and US-Australia alliances shifting from local defense to Taiwan
US-Korea alliance once focused almost exclusively on North Korea; Taiwan is now unavoidable. US-Australia ties, structured since the 1952 Radford-Collins agreement around geographic division of labor, now have America pushing Australia to extend strategy into Taiwan contingencies, expand forward positioning, adjust logistics, and raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP.
— Evan FeigenbaumAmerica wants hegemony without paying the cost of public goods
Evan finds America's regional policy ‘strong on attitude, weak on strategy; strong on security, weak on everything else’. It has no coherent regional vision (no longer pushing trade liberalization) and no consistent logic (why antagonize all allies if the goal is balancing China?—yet China-focused competition has led the US to trade wars with India, not China). America is pursuing ‘empire on the cheap’: maintaining hegemony while closing markets and withdrawing public goods.
— Evan FeigenbaumChina is adopting America's toolkit of economic coercion
China's Central Asian economic ties have shifted from oil and gas to digital infrastructure and renewables, giving China gravitational pull through geography and economy, without needing to ‘persuade’. But China is also copying American coercion methods. America has the Entity List; China created the unreliable entities list. America sanctions firms and people; so does China. More absurd: Hong Kong's National Security Law Article 29, Section 4 makes compliance with foreign sanctions illegal—China has written extraterritorial jurisdiction into its own statute.
— Evan FeigenbaumSolve functional problems with real coalitions, not ceremonial forums
US officials have recently obsessed with building trilateral and quadrilateral mechanisms; someone seriously proposed the US-Japan-Kazakhstan arrangement. Evan's counter: what's the point? His advice to middle powers: stop chasing form. Instead, assemble genuinely capable countries to solve concrete functional problems. DEPA, the digital trade agreement, emerged when four TPP countries collaborated; that's how rules get set in a world where both America and China are faltering.
— Evan FeigenbaumQuad worked for nine days, then became purely symbolic diplomacy
Quad started in 2004 as a tsunami-relief mechanism. In nine days, the US, Japan, Australia, and India finished the rescue. No ministerial meetings. No summit. No joint communiqué. No secretariat. Task done—the mechanism dissolved itself. When Japan later revived Quad, the emphasis shifted to form: summits, photo opportunities, declarations. Evan criticizes this: people now debate whether Quad works precisely because it became formal machinery rather than functional response.
— Evan FeigenbaumIn their own words · checked verbatim
if we don't write the rules in Asia, China's going to write the rules in Asia
Evan Feigenbaum8:25
both countries are largely out to lunch about this and they are racing to the bottom, refracting almost everything in the region through the prism of their competition with one another
Evan Feigenbaum16:27
we have securitized our approach to China and we have Chinified our approach to Asia
Evan Feigenbaum17:28
it's kind of long on attitude, short on strategy, and long on security, but short on everything else
Evan Feigenbaum26:34
if it's America first for you, then does that mean us last?
Evan Feigenbaum28:34
what the hell does the Quad do anyway? Oh, they have a photo op.
Evan Feigenbaum37:38
for nine days provided rapid and effective relief around the Indian Ocean littoral
Evan Feigenbaum38:38
Figures
| Quad's tsunami relief duration | 9 days | 38:38 |
| Hong Kong National Security Law extraterritorial provision | Article 29, Section 4 | 32:37 |
Glossary
- strategic narcissist
- A great power that casts nearly all regional affairs as competition with its rival.
- securitize
- Redefine economic or technical issues as national security problems.
- Radford-Collins agreement
- 1952 US-Australia defense arrangement dividing Pacific responsibilities and geographic labor.
- unreliable entities list
- China's parallel to the US Entity List, used to sanction specific companies.
- DEPA
- Digital trade rules agreement led by New Zealand and Singapore.
How to listen
Policy researchers tracking Asia-Pacific geostrategic shifts, middle-power diplomatic space, and US-China competition; corporate heads of global strategy.
The host's lengthy opening remarks and chitchat (0:14-6:23) can be skipped without losing the argument.