意识不是剧场：Dennett 说体验就是判断本身

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there's nothing that you experience that doesn't come without a frame for that experience.

你体验到的任何东西，都不是不带框架地到来的。

Dylan4:43

The closest thing to the fixed display ends up being what you end up writing down in your memory that you refer back to. And even that could be wrong.

最接近那个固定显示画面的东西，最终就是你写进记忆、之后回头调取的那份记录。而连那份都可能是错的。

Dylan5:54

it doesn't make any sense to me that there's a distinction between the feeling of being conscious and the act of judging.

对我来说，把「感到自己有意识」和「做出判断」区分开来，完全说不通。

Dylan23:43

the experience of consciousness is. Experience of me is just a living being that's making judgments and decisions and conclusions about the world. And that's the experience of being conscious. That's what consciousness is.

意识的体验，我的体验，就是一个活着的存在在对外部世界做出判断、决定和结论。这就是有意识的体验。意识就是这个。

Dylan24:46

when you say that your felt experience is something that is a conclusion that's made up by your active combination of your memories and your active thinking about the world, and that's distinct from the flow of chemicals and electrical pulses that are through your body, that somehow it's not merely explained by, and therefore it's an illusion. That conclusion I just find totally bizarre.

当你说你的感受体验是由记忆和对世界的主动思考组合而成的一个结论，它不同于流经你身体的化学物质和电脉冲，于是它就不只是被解释了，因此它是一个错觉——这个结论我只觉得完全莫名其妙。

Dylan41:09

why does liquidity at all come along with the H2O and the chemicals involved, the chemical process?

为什么流动性会跟着 H2O 和相关的化学过程一起出现？

Christopher42:19

There's no thought that, you know, it's the pineal gland that is there receiving all the information and making all the decisions or something like Descartes would say.

不存在这样一个想法：是松果体在那里接收所有信息并做出所有决定，像笛卡尔会说的那样。

Mark46:19

术语

multiple drafts model多重草稿模型

Dennett 的模型：大脑里同时跑着多份解释草稿，没有中央屏幕，也没有定稿。

heterophenomenology异现象学

第三人称的现象学：听人描述自己的体验，但不把它当作真实无误的记录。

phi phenomenonphi 现象

两个先后闪现在不同位置的点，被看成同一个点在移动。

qualia感受质

体验中那些被认为内在的、不可言说的主观性质，比如看到红色的那种感觉。

illusionism错觉论

主张我们的现象体验是一种误表征，它并不具有人们以为它有的那些属性。

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