意識不是劇場：Dennett 說體驗就是判斷本身

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there's nothing that you experience that doesn't come without a frame for that experience.

你體驗到的任何東西，都不是不帶框架地到來的。

Dylan4:43

The closest thing to the fixed display ends up being what you end up writing down in your memory that you refer back to. And even that could be wrong.

最接近那個固定顯示畫面的東西，最終就是你寫進記憶、之後回頭調取的那份記錄。而連那份都可能是錯的。

Dylan5:54

it doesn't make any sense to me that there's a distinction between the feeling of being conscious and the act of judging.

對我來說，把「感到自己有意識」和「做出判斷」區分開來，完全說不通。

Dylan23:43

the experience of consciousness is. Experience of me is just a living being that's making judgments and decisions and conclusions about the world. And that's the experience of being conscious. That's what consciousness is.

意識的體驗，我的體驗，就是一個活著的存在在對外部世界做出判斷、決定和結論。這就是有意識的體驗。意識就是這個。

Dylan24:46

when you say that your felt experience is something that is a conclusion that's made up by your active combination of your memories and your active thinking about the world, and that's distinct from the flow of chemicals and electrical pulses that are through your body, that somehow it's not merely explained by, and therefore it's an illusion. That conclusion I just find totally bizarre.

當你說你的感受體驗是由記憶和對世界的主動思考組合而成的一個結論，它不同於流經你身體的化學物質和電脈衝，於是它就不只是被解釋了，因此它是一個錯覺——這個結論我只覺得完全莫名其妙。

Dylan41:09

why does liquidity at all come along with the H2O and the chemicals involved, the chemical process?

為什麼流動性會跟著 H2O 和相關的化學過程一起出現？

Christopher42:19

There's no thought that, you know, it's the pineal gland that is there receiving all the information and making all the decisions or something like Descartes would say.

不存在這樣一個想法：是松果體在那裡接收所有信息並做出所有決定，像笛卡爾會說的那樣。

Mark46:19

術語

multiple drafts model多重草稿模型

Dennett 的模型：大腦裡同時跑著多份解釋草稿，沒有中央屏幕，也沒有定稿。

heterophenomenology異現象學

第三人稱的現象學：聽人描述自己的體驗，但不把它當作真實無誤的記錄。

phi phenomenonphi 現象

兩個先後閃現在不同位置的點，被看成同一個點在移動。

qualia感受質

體驗中那些被認為內在的、不可言說的主觀性質，比如看到紅色的那種感覺。

illusionism錯覺論

主張我們的現象體驗是一種誤表徵，它並不具有人們以為它有的那些屬性。

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