The Battle of New York: Howe Let Washington Escape Three Times, and That's Why America Survived
Britain's objective was to destroy Washington's army, not to take the city. Three times Howe let his prey slip away, and Washington learned one thing: as long as the army still existed, America was still alive.
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The sheer scale of the British deployment was itself intimidation
By August 1776, Howe had roughly 30,000 men and 400 ships. Before this, no nation or empire had ever projected a force of that magnitude across such a distance of ocean. This is not just the rhetoric of "a large army" — it is a demonstration of Britain's capacity to project national power after engineering, science and the Industrial Revolution, and at the same time a terrifying index of what the North American rebels were actually up against: hundreds of ships, thousands of men, tens of thousands of muskets, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, gallons upon gallons of rum and barrels upon barrels of beef, all shipped from thousands of miles away.
— Dan SnowBritain gambled on one battle because it couldn't afford to drag things out
Colonial Secretary Lord Germain argued that "one decisive blow on land is absolutely necessary," that the rebellion had to be ended in a single campaign. Dan Snow names this outright the short war fallacy — "one hard shove and we'll be home by Christmas for tea and medals." It wasn't that Britain failed to understand the colonies were too vast to conquer inch by inch; precisely because it understood that, it had to gamble on a decisive battle: dragging things out would wreck its finances. The American logic was far simpler — just survive, and wait for Britain's money, patience, attention and morale to run out.
— Dan SnowBoth sides, unusually, agreed New York was the key
In military history one side is usually happy to watch its opponent rush toward the wrong objective, but this time both Britain and America identified New York as the optimal solution. New York controlled a great river route into the interior and could sever the link between New England and the southern colonies; Washington called it a "post of infinite importance," saying that if the British took the city and the Hudson River they could cut off communication between the northern and southern colonies, "upon which depends the safety of America." The British plan was to take New York and then move north up the Hudson, while a force marching south from Canada came down the lake-and-river corridor, the two meeting on the Hudson to complete the encirclement of New England — like driving a wedge into wood and then striking it through with a single hammer blow.
— Dan SnowHessian mercenaries: a tiny state turned its population into an export commodity
Unable to recruit enough soldiers, Britain first tried Scottish Highlanders, then turned to the small German states. Hesse-Kassel had only about 300,000 people and an area roughly half that of London, yet was one of the most militarised states in Europe: every Hessian male was registered for military service at age seven, and from 16 to 30 had to report to the recruiting office every year; key industries could be exempted, while vagrants and the unemployed were handed a uniform and a musket. In times of high demand, as much as 15% of the entire population was in service, and about a quarter of all households had someone in the army. Over the whole war the German side supplied as many as 35,000 men, roughly a quarter of the British army, for which Britain paid millions of pounds — but for the soldiers themselves it was a bad bargain: a quarter died in America, another quarter deserted or were captured and then vanished into the population, and only about half ever made it home.
— Dan SnowThe more fortifications you build, the more fortifications you need
Washington's defence of New York fell into a classic case of "fortification creep": the batteries on Manhattan could stop a frontal attack, but looking south from lower Manhattan there was Governor's Island, and if that fell to the enemy it was a firing platform for bombarding Manhattan, so a thousand men had to be sent to fortify it and mount ten heavy guns; looking further southeast there were the Brooklyn Heights, whose batteries could pound the Manhattan line to dust, so Brooklyn too had to be fortified; and the key to holding the Brooklyn Heights then became the Guanas Heights inland on Long Island. With the British holding command of the sea and able to choose the time and place of landing, Washington could only spread his troops thinner and thinner, exposed to the risk of being defeated piecemeal.
— Dan SnowReconnaissance found a fourth pass left unguarded
Clinton suggested first reconnoitring whether the Americans had really fortified every pass, and Howe agreed — he had seen British infantry blood at Bunker Hill and did not want another frontal assault. The reconnaissance found troops at three passes, but the fourth, the northernmost and furthest from the landing point, Jamaica Pass, was wide open. The plan took shape from there: Howe would lead the main body, with Clinton guiding, through Jamaica Pass straight to Bedford, fire a shot there as the signal, while the other two columns assaulted Gowanus Heights simultaneously, splitting and pinning the Americans. Washington kept pouring reinforcements onto Long Island and had reconnoitred it himself, yet he had precisely failed to post a blocking force at Jamaica Pass. In the end a junior commander paid out of his own pocket to station five mounted men there, and was never reimbursed. Five men cannot stop ten thousand redcoats, no matter how much you love liberty.
A thick fog saved the American republic
From the early hours of 30 August a thick fog, together with the northeasterly wind that had been blowing for days, kept the Royal Navy out of the East River. The author says that even a single small armed sailing vessel with a few guns on the scene would have turned the crossing of the little boat flotilla into hell. A British captain later said it left him in "inexpressible astonishment and concern." This evacuation, compared to an American Dunkirk, let Washington's army and its commander slip out of British hands. The narrator points out the central contradiction of the whole campaign: the real purpose of the expedition was to destroy Washington and his army, not to occupy the city. He says outright that Howe sometimes did not truly internalise this. As long as that army was still marching, America was still alive.
When her husband fell, his wife took over the gun
During the assault on Fort Washington, the American artilleryman John Corbyn was struck down at his gun, and his wife Margaret immediately took his place. She knew how to use the rammer to check the bore for residue and embers, how to swab it with a wet cloth, how to load the charge, tamp it down, roll the shot into the bore, wad it with old rope or straw, and how to brace her shoulder against the wheel to run the gun back up after recoil. She impressed the rest of the gun crew and fitted straight into this skilled team. She fought on until an explosion wounded her in the chest, arm and jaw, and the crew was finally suppressed and the position taken. She survived, was released because she was a woman, but was left disabled by her wounds and became the first American woman to receive a military pension. After Fort Washington fell, Washington watched the fighting from the Jersey shore and wept. He should never have left that garrison where it was, and he immediately claimed this had happened against his orders. His ambitious subordinate General Lee wrote to him calling it a damned affair, while at the same time writing to powerful allies in Philadelphia to stab Washington in the back. Lee had himself named dictator at this moment of crisis. The narrator points out that at this very moment George Washington could perfectly well have been relieved of command and replaced; his position hung by a thread.
In their own words · checked verbatim
So short war fallacy alert. One hard shove and we'll be home by Christmas for tea and medals.
Dan Snow9:17
Taking New York would be like smashing a wedge into a log of wood, and then you just hit that wedge and drive it right through the heart of the tree trunk.
Dan Snow13:19
General Howe is either our friend or no general. He had our whole army in his power, yet suffered us to escape without the least disruption.
wars are not won by evacuations
the war should be defensive. We should on all occasions avoid a general action or put anything to risk unless compelled.
These Brits were not supermen. Shoot them, stab them, and they bled. They got scared. They turned. They retreated.
The art of war is to find the enemy's center of mass, its brain, its beating heart, and then kill it.
But this was not about capturing territory. This was about destroying an idea.
Figures
| Strength of Howe's force on arrival at New York | about 30,000 men | 3:04 |
| Number of ships in Howe's force on arrival at New York | 400 | 3:04 |
| Total German troops supplied to Britain | as many as 35,000 men, roughly a quarter of the British army | 21:26 |
| Fate of Hessian soldiers | about a quarter died, about a quarter deserted or were captured and stayed, only about half returned home | 21:26 |
| Landing date | 22 August 1776 | 40:06 |
| Troops and guns ashore before noon | 15,000 men, 40 guns | 42:11 |
| Survivors of the Maryland rearguard | only 9 of 250 | 55:47 |
| Americans captured at Fort Washington | 3000 | 1:38:29 |
| Guns captured at Fort Washington | 40 | 1:38:29 |
| British casualties at Fort Washington | 450 | 1:38:29 |
Glossary
- short war fallacy
- The mistaken belief that a single decisive battle can end a war.
- fortification creep
- Continuously extending a defensive line outward to protect one point, spreading your troops ever thinner.
- Hessians
- Professional soldiers rented out to Britain by small German states, making up roughly a quarter of the British army.
- Jamaica Pass
- The northernmost pass on Long Island, left unfortified by the Americans, through which the British outflanked them.
How to listen
Founders and investors interested in military history, strategic decision-making, and cases of "misaligned objectives."
The Fort Washington detail after 1:35:22 can be fast-forwarded; the core judgment is already in the earlier material.