Populists Don't Win by Persuasion, They Fill the Vacuum Left by Civil Society
Brown's judgment is that populist parties don't win support by persuasion but by stepping into the space left by weakened civic organizations — 45% of Britons belong to no organization at all, and volunteering has fallen from 27% to 17%.
The video won't play here. Listen to the audio instead:
The argument · tap a timestamp to hear it
The rules-based order is giving way to a power order
Brown breaks the changes wrought by globalization into three earthquakes: from a US-led unipolar world to a multipolar one with multiple decision centers; from free trade treated as a guarantee of prosperity to protectionism, with politics starting to determine economics rather than economics determining politics; and, most dangerously, from a rules-based order to a power order. His evidence is the latest V Dem survey — 88 democracies, 91 autocracies, three-quarters of people living in less-than-democratic environments. The power order shows up in Putin's invasion of Ukraine, Netanyahu in Gaza, Trump on Iran, and the might-makes-right worldview running through 65 conflicts worldwide, plus the "America First, India First, China First" style of populist nationalist politics.
— Gordon BrownIf you don't fight for democracy, you'll fight against it
Fukuyama says he spent 30 years explaining what "the end of history" is not: it's Hegel's usage, History with a capital H, what today we'd call modernization or development; his observation was that countries wouldn't go communist but would land on some version of liberal democracy plus a market economy. The problem is that readers don't read the last five chapters — the part about "the last man." The last man is the person who appears at the end of history, content with peace and prosperity but without pride, without striving. Fukuyama thinks people don't like that world; they want to struggle for something, and if they can't struggle for democracy, they'll struggle against it, as both the far left and far right have done in recent years. So one danger is boredom, and boredom breeds an activism that destroys existing institutions.
— Francis FukuyamaAmerica's twenty years of distraction were China's gift
Maddox says that 30 years ago she stood on the Shanghai riverfront, and the Chinese side pointed across the water at empty land and said a city called Pudong would rise there, full of skyscrapers; everyone nodded politely and went back to the British consulate. That empty land is now blocks of high-rises. She calls US-China relations the backdrop to all of this: America has never had an adversary like China that openly declares its own organizing model superior and aims to pull the world toward its side technologically, militarily and economically. That's where the claim that the US overreacted to 9/11 comes from: Afghanistan had a lot of international support, Iraq far less, both failed, and the whole world watched; the US was distracted and spent enormous sums at the same time, and Chinese officials told her that was a gift they never expected — America's twenty years of distraction.
— Bronwyn MaddoxPopulism isn't complacency after doing too well
This is the clearest disagreement in the episode. Fukuyama's explanation is that when you live in a society that respects your rights and lets you live decently, you take it for granted and then want more — his word is complacency. Maddox says explicitly that she disagrees: both books are asking why people are so dissatisfied now, including people living in the democracy with the world's highest GDP per capita; but "they already have everything and face no external threat, so they're complacent" can't explain that vote in Germany, can't explain the anger of people who feel left behind, and can't explain elite decisions like the financial crisis that didn't work for them. Whether people really were left behind is another question, but she doesn't think populism's rise comes from complacency.
— Bronwyn Maddox45% of Britons belong to no organization at all
Brown cites Burke: all that's needed for evil to triumph is for good people to do nothing; he thinks apathy, abstention and withdrawal are among the biggest problems. His figures: UK trade union membership halved, church membership down by more than half, the Women's Institute and Mothers' Union halved, uniformed groups among the young halved, 1,200 youth clubs gone, and the volunteering rate down from 27% to 17% of adults. Now 45% of people belong to no organization at all, whether sports, cultural, religious or union. He says that if physical infrastructure like roads and railways collapsed, people would demand immediate action; if banks couldn't pay out, there'd be panic; but the civic infrastructure is collapsing before our eyes. He also cites post-WWII research on resistance members: the most common answer was, because someone I respected asked me to join.
— Gordon BrownWhen civic organizations collapse, populists fill the gap
Host Sutcliffe sets a trap: Jefferson said that if you want to know who you are, don't ask, act, and action will define you — but the people gathered outside migrant hospitals and shelters are also acting. Brown concedes that's exactly the problem: many communities have developed a vacuum, and the civic organizations of the past either no longer exist or are too weak to withstand the pressure of populist nationalism. Once a vacuum appears, someone walks into it — Trump, Farage, Le Pen, Wilders, people who say "we speak for you, because no one else does." The point isn't that people automatically agree with their views, but that they fill the space left by weak civic organizations. Maddox adds: the vacuum is also being filled by another force, a set of very powerful large companies, a kind of technocratic rule that could capture politics.
— Gordon BrownMiddle powers get their power from recombining alliances
A report Maddox and two colleagues published two weeks ago defines middle powers as countries that are "neither the US nor China" — the term is diplomatic jargon, but it describes the situation of most countries in the world: how to position themselves between the two superpowers. She argues middle powers aren't powerless: they have enormous power over their own citizens, and they can band together to explore coalitions that influence what the US and China do, and Britain is in that position. She quotes a veteran Middle Eastern political figure: it's like the Cold War now, with countries split into two sides on any issue; but it's also unlike the Cold War, because the groupings differ on every issue. So what's needed isn't one grand alliance but many — one on the environment, one on trade, one on protecting Greenland. Her three priorities for Britain: move closer to Europe on security and economics, but not rejoin; develop one-on-one relationships with countries sharing common values, like the UK-Japan, UK-Korea, UK-Nigeria ties; and settle the defense budget now.
— Bronwyn MaddoxChinese EVs could destroy the European car industry
Maddox says she'd put it more bluntly: Chinese EVs could destroy the European car industry, and Volkswagen has just announced mass layoffs. If Germany loses the car industry and the supply chain behind it, the social shock is a nightmare — exactly what the China shock did to the US in the early 2000s. Fukuyama picks up: economic efficiency isn't the only value, social stability matters; the US imposed a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs under Biden because he didn't want to see another China shock, and he thinks that was reasonable policy. Maddox agrees completely, and says Europe and Britain woke up too late — not just on EVs, but on less glamorous industries like pharmaceuticals, electricals, shipbuilding and factory automation, where China has already made dominating them a goal, and the results started showing last year and this year.
— Bronwyn MaddoxIn their own words · checked verbatim
politics is deciding economics rather than economics deciding politics
Gordon Brown2:12
if they can't struggle for democracy, they're going to struggle against democracy
Francis Fukuyama5:13
that was a gift we never thought we would be given two decades of American distraction
Bronwyn Maddox6:15
If a void is created, then someone's going to walk into it. And it's the Trumps, it's the Farage's, it's the Le Pen's, it's the Wilder's, it's all these people who are populist nationalists.
Gordon Brown18:39
But the civic infrastructure is collapsing before our eyes.
Gordon Brown22:48
we don't infer conclusions from facts we start with conclusions and we pick facts that support those conclusions
Francis Fukuyama27:03
it's like the Cold War in that on any issue, countries line up on one side or the other, except it's not like the Cold War. It's different alignments on every one.
Bronwyn Maddox34:16
imposed 100 percent tariff on Chinese EVs because, you know, he didn't want to see another China shock occur
Francis Fukuyama40:33
Figures
| Number of democracies in the V Dem survey | 88 | 2:12 |
| Number of autocracies in the V Dem survey | 91 | 2:12 |
| Share of the population living in less-than-democratic environments | three-quarters | 2:12 |
| Number of conflicts worldwide | 65 | 2:12 |
| Share of Britons belonging to no organization | 45% | 17:34 |
| Change in the UK adult volunteering rate | from 27% to 17% | 22:48 |
| Number of UK youth clubs that have disappeared | 1,200 | 22:48 |
| US tariff on Chinese EVs | 100% | 40:33 |
Glossary
- thumos
- Greek for the third psychological drive in people, alongside reason and desire: the craving to be respected by others.
- motivated reasoning
- Not deriving a conclusion from the facts, but starting with a conclusion and then picking the facts that support it.
- middle power
- In diplomatic usage, a country that is neither the US nor China, whose situation is how to position itself between the two great powers.
- circles of sympathy
- Adam Smith's idea: loyalty is strongest toward those closest to us, and outer circles can extend to distant others through information and upbringing.
- bridging capital
- Putnam's term for social networks that let people build ties across ethnic and religious differences.
- The Last Man
- The figure in Fukuyama's book: someone content with peace and prosperity, without higher aspirations.
How to listen
Readers who care about populism, civil society and European industrial policy toward China; founders and investors doing overseas business should focus on the last third.
The final ~40 seconds of AI discussion gets cut off by the host for lack of time and contains almost nothing.