Li-Ning rebranded only the logo, but chose a spokesperson born in the 1970s
Li-Ning tried to rejuvenate with a rebrand as ‘Gen-90s Li-Ning’, but only changed the logo without updating the product. Spokesperson Lin Zhiling (林志玲) is a full generation older than the target consumer, so the rebrand quickly lost momentum.
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The argument · tap a timestamp to hear it
Beijing counter conquest locked Anta into domestic retail forever
Ding Shizhong (丁世忠) left his hometown at 17 to sell shoes in Beijing, speaking accented Mandarin. Over two or three years, he secured counters at major department stores—Xidan and Wangfujing. While Anta was still doing OEM export work, this experience convinced him domestic retail channels came first, a bet years ahead of peers and became the seed of Anta's channel system.
— Huang ZiyiAnta staked a year's profit on Kong Linghui's endorsement
In 2000, Anta signed Kong Linghui (孔令辉) to endorse the brand for over 800,000 yuan a year, then spent triple that again on advertising—over 3 million total, the entire year's profit. Shareholders opposed it; Ding countered: who knows Kong Linghui, or Anta? He pledged to take no dividend if it failed. The bet paid off spectacularly, becoming Ding's power move with his family shareholders.
— Huang ZiyiBloated inventory—stocks piled high enough to dress China three years
Around 2011, Jinjiang brands hit an inventory wall. Many reached 1:10 stock-to-sales ratios (normal: 1:4 or 1:5)—enough accumulated shoes for the whole country to wear for three or four years if factories stopped. The cause: brands wholesaled at biannual trade shows, then watched it filter through distributors with no real-time consumer feedback. They couldn't see demand had shifted.
— Huang ZiyiRebrand a logo, skip the product: Li-Ning's career-altering blunder
Around 2010, Li-Ning rode the Beijing Olympics windfall and launched a long-planned rebrand—new logo, positioning as ‘Gen-90s Li-Ning’ (founded 1990, target: youth). But no product refresh followed. Old goods with the old logo piled up unsold; new-logo products flopped. Sales tanked. Operating cash flow dropped to barely 10 million in a year.
— Huang ZiyiRadical restructuring—close 1,200 stores, absorb 2 billion loss, wait four years
Founder Li-Ning returned and brought in Jin Zhenjun (金珍君), a TPG executive, as co-CEO. Together they cut HQ staff by over 30%, closed 1,200 stores in a year, and fire-saled inventory at 10–20% of price. That year's loss: 2 billion. Cash so tight Li-Ning couldn't renew sponsorship of the Chinese gymnastics team it had backed for twenty years. It wasn't until 2015 that Li-Ning broke even again—years behind Anta.
— Huang ZiyiFILA's 24 cycles a year beat Anta's core brand
Anta bought FILA from Belle in 2009, at first just slapping FILA labels on Anta-style shoes—a flop. Ding then gave the design team independence, sharing only supply chain and logistics. He pushed product cycles from the industry standard of four to six drops a year to 24. FILA opened direct-to-consumer stores in new malls like Wanda, becoming more profitable than Anta's core brand.
— Huang ZiyiDownturns favor the underdog willing to race price to the bottom
In recent years, the fastest-growing Chinese sportswear brand wasn't Anta or Li-Ning—it was 361°. The strategy: capture the downtrading corner. In commodity categories, consumers chase price; brands are interchangeable; lowest price wins. Meanwhile outdoor, snow sports, and women's athletic drew loyal customers to Arc'teryx, Descente, and Kailas. The market split into a K-shape: cheap for the masses, premium for niches.
— Huang ZiyiPerfect imitation beats nothing—but someone must invent the standard
Chinese brands have localized carbon-plate midsoles and got them cost-competitive. But Nike's carbon-plate patents belong to French Arkema, Adidas Boost to German BASF, and Flyknit to Nike. Chinese brands excel at perfecting what others invented—optimizing one element of someone else's playbook. They've never set the standard itself, which is seen as the hardest barrier to break.
— Huang ZiyiIn their own words · checked verbatim
"For two or three years he did something that looks incredible now—what was it? For two or three years he secured counters at major department stores like Xidan and Wangfujing."
他花了两三年时间 做了一件现在看起来很匪夷所思的事 什么事呢 就花了两三年时间 他拿下了西单和王府井这样大卖场的柜台
Huang Ziyi25:24
"Back then Anta's entire company profit for a year was barely 3 million—it was like he had to stake the entire year's earnings on this advertising campaign to sign Kong Linghui."
那会儿安踏整个公司的利润一年也就300多 相当于他要把整个公司一年的利润投过去去砸这个广告 去签约孔宁辉
Huang Ziyi38:37
"He asked: back then, who did more people recognize—Kong Linghui or Anta?"
他说那现在是认识孔宁辉的人多呢 还是认识安踏的人多
Huang Ziyi39:39
"The shoes piling up in their inventory could dress the whole country for three to four years."
他们库存里边积压的鞋子 都够全国人民穿个三到四年
Huang Ziyi1:04:48
"Traditional Jinjiang brand trade shows happen four times a year, maybe six at most. But when running FILA, that person demanded 24 product cycles annually, constantly rolling out new stock."
传统的近江品牌的订货会 刚刚聊了一年四次 大不了六次 但是菲拉做此做的时候 那个人要求菲拉一年要按24个波段 不断的上行
Huang Ziyi1:36:27
"Nike's carbon-plate shoes—that tech is controlled by French Arkema. Adidas Boost is in German BASF's hands. If we want to make carbon-plate shoes, we still have to work with these companies. We don't define the standard ourselves."
像耐克的那个碳板跑鞋 他掌握在那个什么法国阿克马手里 阿迪的Boost 阿迪的那个跑鞋掌握在德国巴斯夫手里 我们要做碳板跑鞋的话 我们还是要跟这些公司去合作 就是我们自己不定义那个标准
Huang Ziyi2:04:49
Figures
| Inventory crisis stock-to-sales ratios | Some brands hit 1:10 (normal range 1:4 to 1:5) | 1:04:48 |
| FILA product-launch frequency | 24 annual cycles (traditional trade shows 4-6 per year) | 1:36:27 |
| Chinese Jordan Feiying PB running shoe performance | 80%-90% function of Nike carbon-plate equivalent, lower price | 50:43 |
Glossary
- DTC (Direct-to-Consumer)
- Brand directly opens stores to reach consumers, bypassing distributor layers and traditional wholesale channels.
- Flyknit
- Nike-patented knit-fabric technique for running shoes that balances foot fit and breathability with lightweight design.
- ERP/POS
- Inventory and point-of-sale systems that give brands real-time visibility into distributor sales and stock levels.
How to listen
Investors and analysts tracking consumer-brand cycles, channel shifts, and organizational decisions; anyone wanting to understand how Jinjiang manufacturing upgraded.
The first 18 minutes cover why the author wrote the book and the origin of the title—light on information, skip it.