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Beijing is forcing AI companies to use Huawei chips, even if it slows their models by half a step

China's industrial policy prioritizes full-stack proprietary supply-chain independence over staying at the AI frontier. Beijing forces companies to shun NVIDIA for Huawei, even if it means falling months behind America.

Chinese industrial policyHuaweiSemiconductorsDeepSeekExport controlsFull-stack integration

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This episode lays bare the actual mechanisms of China's full-stack tech integration—not vague generalizations, but concrete details: DeepSeek and Huawei co-designing chips, HBM bottlenecks, and more. High information density, worth close listening.

The argument · tap a timestamp to hear it

6:13

Cross-industry expansion works because supply chains overflow into new sectors

Kyle Chan's research centers on a diagram of dozens of overlapping circles—a "super Venn diagram". BYD began as a battery company, became an EV company, and now makes chips and autonomous driving systems. Xiaomi jumped from cheap phones and home appliances into carmaking. Outside observers credit Lei Jun's foresight, but they're really feeding off existing supply chains and talent pools. By contrast, Apple tried to make cars and quit; Xiaomi succeeded—a comparison many see as discouraging from an American tech-competition perspective.

13:27

Chinese industrial policy runs on positive and negative signals

Sectors named in the five-year plan—semiconductors, AI, robotics, quantum, fusion, biotech, brain-computer interfaces—send positive signals and unlock resources and local government support. Negative signals also work: the crackdown on hedge funds is part of the system. Some speculate that DeepSeek's shift into AI happened partly because traditional finance institutions felt the pressure.

— Kyle Chan
15:41

Huawei solves chip usability by tying itself to DeepSeek

Huawei's Ascend chips weren't limited by raw compute—they lacked a mature software ecosystem like CUDA, trapped in a chicken-and-egg problem: no users, no libraries; no libraries, no users. Export controls prompted Beijing to push Huawei and DeepSeek into deep collaboration, with engineers from each stationed at the other. Reports suggest the next-generation DeepSeek model will be entirely pretrained on Huawei chips—a watershed moment, marking Huawei's move from "inference-capable" to "training-capable".

— Kyle Chan
20:53

Huawei can make chips, but customers must find HBM themselves

Huawei's bottleneck isn't chip design—it's manufacturing. SMIC has limited lithography capacity, and advanced EUV still depends on ASML in the Netherlands. On HBM, China's CXMT lags SK Hynix, Samsung, and Micron. So Huawei now tells customers: "We can make the NPU, you figure out the HBM."

— Kyle Chan
26:02

AI companies want NVIDIA chips, Beijing insists they use Huawei

This is the episode's sharpest tension. Chinese AI companies would rather keep using the familiar NVIDIA chips—even rushing to apply for Trump's H200 exemptions—but Beijing explicitly requires them to shift toward partnerships with domestic chip makers and help Huawei perfect its chips, securing long-term supply-chain independence even if it widens the gap with American frontier models in the near term. Chip makers welcome the export controls because demand has spiked.

— Kyle Chan
28:06

Xi cares about winning future industries, not consumption

Many Chinese economic policies make sense if you start from this premise: the goal isn't GDP growth itself, but high-tech self-reliance and winning future industries. That explains why the real-estate bubble was deliberately deflated, and why consumer-stimulus measures have been slow in coming. The logic behind "new quality productive forces" is: win the critical industries first, and economic growth and jobs will follow.

— Kyle Chan
34:09

Catching TSMC is like chasing a train that keeps accelerating

Huawei and Chinese chipmakers are improving, but TSMC itself keeps accelerating with the world's best equipment, so this isn't a track where you can cross the finish line—the finish line itself keeps receding. The real bottleneck determining whether China can "keep up well enough" is lithography equipment, particularly immersion DUV and potential EUV capability, and how far Huawei's attempts to bypass process limits through packaging techniques like "logic folding" can go.

— Kyle Chan
38:15

Chinese companies struggle to profit because moats are easy to break

The Shanghai stock market has stalled for years because local government financing and talent mobility are low-friction: industries fill with competitors fast, capacity becomes redundant, and in the end nobody makes money. DJI's dominance in drones is the exception, not the rule.

— Kyle Chan

In their own words · checked verbatim

if there is something that gets built, if it is a built product— there's a good chance that in the future it'll be built in China

Joe Weisenthal2:04

for a lot of things in China, including in China tech, it's the government stupid

Kyle Chan13:27

you have the Chinese ad companies clamoring to get the H200s that Trump allowed to be exported to China. They seem very eager. They were putting in their orders. They were trying to negotiate how much they could get. And you have Beijing itself saying, hold on, hold on, hold on. We don't want so many of these NVIDIA GPUs.

Kyle Chan26:02

Xi Jinping's does not really care that much about the economy or about consumers or about households in the sense that, you know, in the traditional sense that we might think about in the U.S. or in the West

Kyle Chan28:06

the whole chip industry to like trying to catch a bullet train because you like trying to run as fast as possible and accelerate as fast as possible. But the goal that you're trying to catch or the frontier you're trying to catch up to is itself accelerating

Kyle Chan35:11

if the Western models get there before China. You can't afford, if that's a thing, and we don't even know if it's a thing, but if that's a thing, then it's like, that really, I think, puts a limit on the degree to which any model maker can really

Joe Weisenthal42:19

Glossary

self-recursive improvement
The hypothetical point where a model's self-improvement triggers exponential capability growth.
new quality productive forces
The Chinese government's policy term for high-tech-driven economic growth.

How to listen

Who it's for

Investors tracking US-China tech decoupling, chip supply chains, and Chinese industrial policy; semiconductor professionals; and AI industry people wanting to understand the Huawei-DeepSeek relationship.

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