The world is too loud. Read what matters.

Geopolitics Decanted with Dmitri Alperovitch

Wargame Shows Russia Could Isolate the Baltics Without Invasion

In a German think tank's wargame, the expert playing the Russian General Staff discovered that the real edge isn't invading Lithuania—it's using long-range fire and drones to cut off the Baltic states, with invasion merely the cherry on top.

NATOUkraine-Russia conflictTaiwan StraitWargamingDrone warfareBallistic missiles
A military analyst who participated firsthand in wargames and U.S.-China-Taiwan conflict simulations lays out the actual vulnerabilities in two potential conflicts—NATO's and the Taiwan Strait—using concrete numbers and case studies, dense with information and devoid of filler.

The argument · tap a timestamp to hear it

3:11

Russia's real advantage is decision speed, not troop numbers

Gady explains that the wargame assumes Russia already has large forces stationed on the Baltic border; NATO reinforcements must cross the narrow, two-sided Suwalki Gap, inherently slower. Add Russia's ability to establish facts on the ground in 48-72 hours, while the U.S. hesitates to intervene, Poland won't fight, and Germany has never truly answered the foundational question—will it risk nuclear escalation for Lithuania?—and the combination of speed plus nuclear blackmail is enough to paralyze NATO.

— Franz Stefan Gady
7:24

Over 120,000 Grom-2/Shahed 136 drones paralyze Germany's air defense

The wargame designed a plan to strike deep into German territory and cut NATO's logistics, combining long-range drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to saturate air defense. Gady notes that by year-end Russia will have produced over 120,000 Grom-2/Shahed 136 long-range drones, each carrying 40-50 kg of explosives; only hundreds would be needed to saturate Germany's nearly entire air defense system. Germany rather than Poland was chosen precisely because Poland, as a border state, has too dense an air defense network.

— Franz Stefan Gady
10:31

Invading Lithuania is a bonus; the real killing blow is cutting supply

The wargame posits Russia using Lithuania's cutoff of Kaliningrad's supplies—and manufactured famine—as a pretext to establish humanitarian corridors, combined with far-left and far-right parties' information warfare to win European public support. But Gady repeatedly emphasizes that ground invasion is a high-risk gamble, potentially deadlocked within 24 hours. The true critical factor is that Kaliningrad and Belarus's long-range fire, mines, rocket artillery, and drones alone can isolate the Baltic states; NATO would first have to execute a suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses campaign that only the U.S. can carry out.

— Franz Stefan Gady
18:07

The Baltic states should learn from Iran: develop long-range strikes, not ground war

Because the Baltic states lack strategic depth and struggle with mobile defense, Alperovitch proposes they should emulate Iran and develop long-range strike capability to threaten St. Petersburg or even Moscow, establishing deterrence. Gady agrees but adds that the key political problem is this: once NATO forces cross the border to strike targets inside Russia, they risk crossing the threshold for nuclear retaliation. The critical juncture between conventional and nuclear response has never been truly discussed in Europe.

25:16

The Baltics' combined GDP is two-thirds Iran's, yet they can't build ballistic missiles

Gady notes that European nations have virtually no domestic ballistic missile development. Emerging defense startups develop drones and even cruise missiles, but none pursue ballistic missiles, partly due to missile export control regimes. His reference point: the Baltics' combined GDP is about two-thirds of Iran's, yet their population is far smaller. If Iran can mass-produce thousands of ballistic missiles, the Baltics theoretically should be able to as well—but this requires first resolving the political debate: will you accept the nuclear blackmail risk?

— Franz Stefan Gady
33:46

The U.S. military's fatal assumption about China: near-perfect battlefield intelligence

Gady criticizes U.S. military doctrine for assuming near-perfect intelligence of the PLA's system, enabling rapid decisive victory—a dangerous assumption. Even if the U.S. sank the PLA fleet and destroyed its air force, it might resemble the Iran situation now: tactical victory that fails to translate into political objectives. Moreover, vast quantities of precision-guided munitions would be wasted on low-value targets.

— Franz Stefan Gady
37:49

After sinking China's fleet, Taiwan's problem really begins

Gady's core question: what happens after you sink the invasion fleet? Even if the U.S. loses 10-30% of its navy to prevent China from seizing Taiwan, is that worth it for a great power? He cautions that China needn't depend on landing craft to continue punishing Taiwan—it can saturate Taiwan's air defense with ballistic and cruise missiles and even escalate horizontally with strikes in Japan and Guam to tie down U.S. forces. Yet history offers no precedent for air and missile strikes alone forcing surrender and seizing territory.

— Franz Stefan Gady
44:10

Starlink access cut off only after three years of delay

Gady confirms that shutting down Russian forces' Starlink terminals was indeed crucial to Ukraine regaining the advantage in drone warfare. Alperovitch notes this should have been done three years ago—a simple whitelist mechanism would have deactivated all terminals not registered in Ukraine. But it took three years before they brought this obvious solution to Musk for implementation.

In their own words · checked verbatim

the fundamental problem for NATO is that Russia in any contingency would already have a substantial amount of forces very close to the border of the Baltic states

Franz Stefan Gady3:11

by the end of this year, Russia will probably have produced over 120,000 Geran II or Shahed 136 type of long range drones, each packed with 40 to 50 kilograms of explosives

Franz Stefan Gady7:24

You can essentially cut off the Baltics without conducting a ground invasion.

Franz Stefan Gady10:31

just look at just even the combined GDP of the three Baltic countries. It's about two thirds of the GDP of Iran with a much smaller population. So if Iran can produce thousands of ballistic missiles, the Baltics themselves could absolutely do that as well.

Franz Stefan Gady25:16

it assumes that we almost have near perfect information about the adversary system. And I think that's a dangerous, dangerous assumption

Franz Stefan Gady33:46

even if you succeed and you defend Taiwan, you prevent the Chinese from seizing Taiwan, but maybe you lose ten, twenty, thirty percent of your navy in the course of doing so. Is it really worth it for a great power

Franz Stefan Gady37:49

Yes, I would agree with that a hundred percent.

Franz Stefan Gady49:29

Figures

Russian long-range drone production (by year-end)Over 120,000 units7:24
Explosive payload per drone40-50 kg7:24
Forward task force size in wargame scenario~12,000 personnel4:11
German garrison in Lithuania~5,000 (one armored brigade)13:42
Baltic states' combined GDP vs IranTwo-thirds of Iran's GDP25:16

Glossary

war game
A simulation exercise testing military or political decision-making processes rather than predicting outcomes.
Suwalki Gap
A narrow land corridor connecting the Baltic states and Poland, flanked by Kaliningrad and Belarus.
hellscape concept
The U.S. military's vision of using massed drone systems to destroy an invading PLA landing fleet.
vertical escalation
Conflict escalation from conventional armed combat to higher-intensity levels that might trigger nuclear response.
system warfare
A combat philosophy holding that destroying an enemy's critical nodes can collapse its entire combat system.

How to listen

Who it's for

Security analysts tracking NATO's eastern flank, Taiwan Strait conflict modeling, and the Ukraine-Russia battlefield; defense think tank researchers; and investors in relevant sectors.