Russia Won't Invade NATO, But It Is Testing Whether NATO Holds Together
Russia has no capacity for a ground offensive; its real goal is to corrode NATO's political cohesion — using drones, parcel bombs and grey-zone ambiguity to force the US to expose its divisions in a crisis.
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The argument · timestamps estimated from transcript position
No ground-invasion risk, but hybrid escalation is rising
Joshi says it plainly: there is no risk of a Russian conventional ground offensive against NATO, this is not the kind of alarm it was in January 2022. The entire security apparatus of Estonia and Finland exists to detect exactly that kind of movement, and every port, naval base and forest route in western Russia is blanketed with intelligence and technical sensors. But another risk is rising: Russia's tolerance for hybrid operations below the Article V threshold is increasing. They have already used drones against Ukrainian cargo planes that might be bound for Ukraine, planted explosives in DHL parcels in Leipzig, and sabotaged power plants and railways across Europe. The question is: would they actually fire missiles at Polish facilities? Joshi thinks Russia is still quite cautious and wants to avoid dragging NATO into a broader conflict, but that debate is unresolved in Europe.
— Shashank JoshiPoland sounds the loudest alarm; the Baltics say things are fine
The most alarming signal this week came from Poland. Tusk said intelligence indicated Russia might attack Poland and other NATO allies — not a conventional ground attack, but drones and missiles landing on NATO territory that Russia could portray as accidents. But Latvia's leadership, including the defence minister and the president, said there is no reason to panic and no elevated operational risk. Estonia also said it sees no risk of Russia aggressing in that way. Joshi says he has spoken to intelligence officials in multiple countries and sees no reason to fear a ground offensive. The disagreement is itself the signal: Poland is raising the alarm, the Baltic states are cooling things down, and Russia is watching who believes whom.
— Shashank JoshiRussia's real goal is to corrode NATO cohesion
Joshi lays out Russia's political objective: not to conquer NATO territory or occupy Western Europe, but to weaken and break apart NATO's unity. The mechanism works like this: if a drone lands on Polish territory and blows up a warehouse, Russia says it was an accident, and then Trump says ‘I spoke to Putin and he assured me it was an accident’ — and that lays the alliance's internal divisions bare. Under the Biden administration, Jake Sullivan would call the Russians and say that if this continues you are risking us joining the war on Ukraine's side, and we will retaliate. But under a Trump administration, does Russia really believe Trump would step into a crisis the same way? So Russia has an opportunity not only to push back against attacks on Russia, but to test NATO's cohesion and its boundaries.
— Shashank JoshiOn Ukraine, Trump criticises in public and supplies intelligence in private
Joshi says Trump's support for Ukraine is quite limited, far below the Biden era. The US has effectively let weapons aid lapse; Ukraine desperately needs Patriot interceptor missiles, but because the US has burned through so much in the Iran war, it has given Ukraine almost no interceptors recently. Diplomatically, the administration leans toward Russia and expects Ukraine to make concessions. But there are two exceptions: first, the new Graham bill, which the president has agreed to, would impose new sanctions on Russian entities and force Trump to levy tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil and do not reduce their purchases — in practice China and India, and possibly Central European countries. Second, Trump is quietly, not publicly, providing intelligence to Ukraine to help it strike Russian energy facilities. That is the strange reversal: Trump criticises Ukraine overall, but secret assistance is still happening.
— Shashank JoshiThe Strait of Hormuz is still half-closed
The Trump administration insists this is not a war; Trump calls it an ‘excursion’. But the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, and oil traffic is far below pre-war levels. There is no deal with Iran, no resolution. Iran's nuclear programme has no formal limits, and there is no formal commitment to reopen Hormuz. Trump faces the midterms in a month and desperately needs to avoid a sharp escalation of the war that sends oil prices soaring. But politically he cannot make the concessions to Iran that a deal would require, because that would be too humiliating, too obviously equivalent to defeat, and would look catastrophic before an election. So it is a stalemate: Iran has considerable control over the strait, with occasional clashes — the US bombs Iranian coastal missile bases, Iran strikes tankers trying to pass through Hormuz.
— Shashank JoshiHouthis used Claude to improve their ballistic missiles
Joshi tells a striking detail: when Anthropic published its report on harmful uses of Claude, one of the examples was Houthis using Claude to improve their ballistic missile programme. This group, widely seen as technologically primitive, is using the most advanced AI on Earth to improve the guidance systems of the ballistic missiles they fire at shipping in the Middle East. Mounk adds that being able — at least until being cut off — to access the most advanced American technology to strike America and America's allies is itself a fascinating story. This connects the Ukraine and Russia discussion to the Houthi discussion: in modern war, defensive capability dominates on the ground, but offensive capability dominates in the air.
— Shashank JoshiPerception is the primary problem on the battlefield
Joshi offers a unifying framework for why ground defence dominates while air strikes still work: it is all about perception. To hit something, you first need to perceive it — find it on the battlefield, then fire at it. That is much harder than it sounds. Perception is the primary problem on the battlefield; actually firing is secondary. On the Ukrainian front line, this is a sensor-saturated environment: small drones everywhere, thermal cameras detecting movement at night, radar seeing through foliage, satellites targeting the area. Anything that moves gets hit — it is a kill zone. But you cannot perceive everywhere equally easily. Drones can see ten kilometres behind the battlefield, but fifty kilometres back, satellite coverage is patchy. It is like the fog of war in a real-time strategy game — you send units out and the fog clears, but where you have not been remains fog. That is why Iran can still launch ballistic missiles, and why Houthis can fire from the mountains of Yemen into the Red Sea.
— Shashank JoshiIn their own words · checked verbatim
First of all, there is no risk of a Russian conventional ground attack on NATO. This is not right now a January 2022 type situation, where the alarm bells are ringing, the Russians are mobilizing, there's a risk of an attack. That is not the case.
Shashank Joshi4:30
the Russian political objective here is to corrode the political cohesion of NATO. It isn't to conquer NATO territory and take over Western Europe, it is to undermine and dissolve that solidarity.
Shashank Joshi14:20
if a drone lands on Polish soil and blows up a depot and you say it was an accident, and Trump then says, I spoke to Putin, he assured me it was an accident, you are really laying bare the divisions inside the alliance.
Shashank Joshi15:30
when Anthropic, the AI company, published its report on harmful uses of Claude, its AI model, a week ago, one of the examples was the Houthis using Claude to improve their ballistic missile program—which I thought was just fascinating.
Shashank Joshi31:45
Sensing is the preeminent problem of the battlefield; the actual firing at it is kind of secondary, although cheap missiles, of course, help you do that en masse.
Shashank Joshi38:20
At the frontlines you can sense, and therefore it's a kill zone and the defense dominates. If you go behind the frontlines to an Iranian cave in the middle of the mountains, you can have the world's most advanced surveillance apparatus, as the U.S. Air Force and the Israeli Air Force do, and there will always be fog.
Shashank Joshi39:50
Figures
| Risk of a Russian conventional ground offensive against NATO | Does not exist | 4:30 |
| Form of Russian attack warned of in Polish intelligence | Drones and missiles landing on NATO territory, possibly portrayed as accidents | 10:15 |
| US supply of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine | Recently almost no interceptors given at all | 19:40 |
| Oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz | Far below pre-war levels | 26:10 |
| Timing of Trump's midterm elections | In a month | 26:10 |
| Project Houthis improved using Claude | Ballistic missile guidance systems | 31:45 |
Glossary
- Article V
- NATO's collective defence clause: an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.
- hybrid warfare
- Mixed methods below the threshold of conventional war, including cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation.
- Bab-el-Mandeb
- The chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, a critical node for global oil shipping.
- East-West pipeline
- A pipeline inside Saudi Arabia running from the eastern oil fields to the western Red Sea coast, allowing Hormuz to be bypassed.
How to listen
Readers following European security, NATO cohesion and the Middle East; engineers and investors interested in hybrid warfare, military AI applications and the shape of modern war.
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